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EO 11652: XCD3 1 C2 8/15/5

Authorized by: J. D. Galt

August 4, 1975

Recategorized as
Category "A"

/s/ Warren A. Henderson

OCT 1 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Khrushchev

In accordance with our conversation last evening there is attached a draft letter to Prime Minister Khrushchev for your signature.

There is also enclosed a clean copy of the amended talking paper to be used Sunday evening by Mr. Murphy in handing the letter to Mr. Koslov shortly before his departure from Idlewild at midnight.

Case 100

Douglas Dillon
(signed-RM)

Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Draft letter to Prime Minister Khrushchev
2. Talking paper

(DF)

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This document consists of 4 pages
Number 2 of 3 copies, Series 6.

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Category "A"

7/11/57 Warren A. Henderson
OCT 1 1966

Chairman:
Dear Mr. ~~Prime Minister~~:

(M)
For some time past, it has seemed to me that it would be mutually profitable for us to have an informal exchange of views about problems which interest both of us. This thought has been reinforced by a suggestion attributed to you at the time of the recent visit of the American Governors to the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, I have asked Mr. Robert Murphy to communicate to First Deputy Prime Minister Frol R. Koslov, who is departing from the United States this Sunday evening, some ideas for your consideration. Perhaps when you have had time to consider my suggestions, you would be kind enough to communicate your reaction via your Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Menshikov. I am sure that you will agree with me regarding the importance of keeping this matter confidential for the present.

Hoping that this method of communication may be satisfactory to you, believe me

Yours sincerely,

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DF

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AD 6/15/61/9-11-61

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/s/ Warren A. Henderson
OCT 1 1965

TALKING PAPER

(7)
President Eisenhower, in his desire to promote peaceful solutions of international problems, has received reports of statements made by Prime Minister Nikita S. Khrushchev on various international problems which are of interest to the United States Government. At times the point of view attributed to Mr. Khrushchev would seem to imply a certain misunderstanding of the facts as known to President Eisenhower. Having this in mind for some time past, the President would like First Deputy Prime Minister Frol R. Koslov, since the latter is just now departing from the United States and going directly to Moscow, to convey to Prime Minister Khrushchev a personal and confidential message from President Eisenhower.

It might lead to a better understanding of our problems if there could be a personal meeting between Prime Minister Khrushchev and President Eisenhower on an informal basis under arrangements which would facilitate a friendly exchange of views on topics of mutual concern and in a relaxed atmosphere. What is contemplated is not a negotiation but merely a discussion for the purpose of improving the understanding of both parties regarding the problems which concern them.

President

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President Eisenhower is hopeful, as he is sure Prime Minister Khrushchev must be, that the Foreign Ministers who resume their Geneva meeting on July 13 will make such progress as would justify a meeting of the four Heads of State. Should this prove to be the case, President Eisenhower would support the idea of a Four Power meeting at a place such as Quebec, Canada. There are considerations of a practical nature which make Quebec attractive to President Eisenhower as a place for the meeting. First of all, of course, the Canadians have urged its use. As concerns the American side, the President of the United States has constitutional obligations which make extended absence at a greater distance very inconvenient. Congress will undoubtedly be in session throughout most of the summer which requires the President's presence except for very brief periods. If that should be agreeable to Prime Minister Khrushchev, President Eisenhower would like to arrange for the informal meeting above mentioned between Prime Minister Khrushchev and himself at Camp David near Washington at a moment which would be mutually suitable, prior to the Quebec meeting. In the event that Prime Minister Khrushchev would be interested in visiting points of interest in the United States incident to a meeting at Camp David, President Eisenhower would be pleased to make the necessary arrangements. President Eisenhower understands that Prime Minister Khrushchev has a very heavy schedule this

summer

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summer with visits to Poland and Scandinavia, etc., and this may pose for him a practical problem, even assuming that the above outline might be of interest to him. Therefore the question of the exact timing would be a matter on which the views of Mr. Khrushchev would be necessary.

Should the foregoing appeal to Prime Minister Khrushchev as a possibility, President Eisenhower adds that if this is agreeable he might find it possible to visit the Soviet Union later this year, perhaps in October, should that prove convenient to the Soviet authorities.

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W5/ Warren A. Henderson

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Sanbickhoff

The comparative flood of loose and inaccurate statements regarding the United States made by Khrushchev indicates a distorted and harmful misunderstanding of the United States. With the inordinate position of personal power he enjoys, his active participation in Soviet foreign policy, our belief that no important decision on subjects such as Berlin and Germany is made without his approval, there is urgent need to bring to bear on him personally in the most effective way possible a more accurate understanding of our position and policies. We have depended on third parties, foreign nationals, and subordinate U.S. officials for this purpose. Obviously that is inadequate under the circumstances. The Vice President's visit to Moscow, while unquestionably useful, would not be adequate. It is also obvious that Khrushchev keenly desires direct contact with the President. No doubt he wants it to serve his own purposes, but perhaps we could exploit it to serve ours. It is our opinion that the President, with, among other qualities, his knowledge and background, is best equipped to influence Khrushchev in the direction we would wish. Khrushchev has never had direct contact with the United States. His estimate of us as a result of misunderstanding and distorted information, quite apart from the degree of hostility he may entertain, could lead to grave miscalculation in, for example, the German issue, which he has deliberately provoked.

While we had hoped that such direct encounter could be arranged earlier, it is perhaps still timely. We should work for an eventual Summit meeting, to be held at Quebec. De Gaulle may be difficult on

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this but not impossible. To advance this idea, the President should send a top secret personal message to Khrushchev suggesting that if substantial progress is made by the Foreign Ministers in their meeting at Geneva, he would promote a Big Four meeting at Quebec, if that is agreeable to Mr. Khrushchev; that incident and prior to the meeting he would invite Khrushchev to an informal visit with him at Camp David, followed perhaps by a tour of points of interest in the United States at Mr. Khrushchev's convenience. (We know, of course, that Khrushchev has certain commitments in Scandinavia this summer, so that matter of timing may be difficult.)

The President would have with him, if he agrees, a very carefully selected team of government and private citizens (business and labor), qualified to assist in informal conversations covering a wide range of strategic, political and social problems designed to impress on Khrushchev U.S. resources, power, fearlessness, as well as knowledge of the Soviet Union and world affairs.

For the time being, this message would not be communicated to our Allies, but if a favorable reaction is obtained, the President would inform Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer on a top secret and personal basis.

G:RM/vh
7/9/59

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